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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper estimates the effect of gasoline prices on home values and explores 
the degree to which the relationship varies across a city. Using data from 
930,702 home sales in Clark County, Nevada, from 1976 through 2010, we find 
that gasoline prices have significantly different effects on the sales price of homes 
in different neighborhoods. A ten percent increase in gasoline prices is 
associated with changes in location-specific average home values that span a 
range of over $13,000. This suggests that energy policies may affect household 
housing wealth via gasoline prices, a heretofore unrecognized distributional 
outcome. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A large literature explores the economic and distributional effects of potential 
carbon pricing policies, including how taxing carbon could raise retail energy 
prices and differentially affect households across regions and income classes.1 A 
growing literature connects the effects of energy prices to the value of durable 
household goods.2 For example, Busse et al (2013) estimate consumers’ 
willingness to pay for vehicle fuel economy and find that a $1 increase in the 
price of gasoline is associated with an increase of $354 in the average price of 
the highest fuel economy quartile of cars relative to that of the lowest fuel 
economy quartile. They found an estimated relative price difference of $1,945 
for used cars.  
Hedonic studies of home values have analyzed how home heating oil prices and 
energy efficiency investments could be capitalized into home values,3 but so far 
1 EPA (2010), Hassett et al (2009), Rausch et al (2010), Mathur and Morris (2014). 
2 Langer and Miller (2013) 
3 Walls et al (2013) review this literature and find that households do value the energy-related 
costs of home ownership as reflected in the price premium associated with energy efficiency 
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no research has examined the potential of fuel taxes to affect home prices, and 
little research has related gasoline prices to households’ willingness to pay for 
homes.4 Households adjust to changes in gasoline prices via their choices of 
vehicle, where to live and work, and mode of transport. Communities adjust 
through investments in infrastructure and housing supply. Inducing these shifts is 
key to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from transport fuels. Thus, 
understanding how housing markets respond to gasoline prices is important for 
anticipating the environmental and distributional outcomes of energy policies. 
The relationship between gasoline and housing markets could also be important 
to understanding broader housing market dynamics, including the relative prices 
of close-in and far flung homes, mortgage performance, the 2008 housing bust, 
and the location of new housing supply. For example, Glaeser et al (2012) find 
that during the last two housing booms, home prices rose significantly less in 
areas farther from the central business district. Gasoline prices could help 
explain why their result was far more pronounced during the 1996-2006 housing 
boom (a period in which real gasoline prices tripled) than during 1982-89 
housing boom (a period in which real gasoline prices fell) and why, during the 
second boom, the price growth gradient was flatter in areas in which more 
adults take public transit.  
Some evidence links gasoline prices to lending risks and the 2008 housing bust. 
For example, Kaufmann et al (2011) show that spikes in gasoline prices can 
stress household budgets and contribute to mortgage non-performance. 
Cortright (2008) relates the initial signs of the collapse of the housing bubble 
with the run-up in oil prices in 2008. And Sexton et al (2012) connect the rapid 
run-up of gasoline prices in 2007 to 2008 to the bursting of the U.S. housing 
market bubble. Their simulations support their theory that the greater the 
commuting distance from the central business district, the more a gasoline price 
shock causes home values to decline.  
certification. Eicholtz et al (2013) find that certified green buildings have rents and asset prices 
that are significantly higher than those documented for conventional office space. 
4  Coulson and Engle (1987) find that increases in gas prices between 1974 and 1979 boosted the 
differential between central city and suburban house prices in a sample of six cities. 
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Molloy and Shan (2013) investigate the effect of gasoline prices on the location of 
new home construction and home prices across the United States. They find 
that a 10 percent increase in gasoline prices leads to a 10 percent decrease in 
construction in locations with a long average commute (greater than 24 minutes) 
relative other locations, but they find no significant change on house prices. 
However, they find that in areas where the housing supply is constrained by 
regulatory or geographic factors and demand for housing is growing, gasoline 
prices have a significant negative effect on home prices in areas with long 
commutes. Their results suggest that if gasoline prices fall and demand for homes 
in the suburbs grows, developers usually just build more suburban homes. If they 
can’t for some reason, then the value of those suburban homes goes up, and the 
lower gasoline prices can boost suburban home values.  
The paper extends the literature in several ways. It is the first to look for direct 
evidence of gasoline prices on property values using property-level data and the 
first to directly estimate price-price elasticities of the two goods or to 
characterize the question in that way. This paper is also the first to produce 
graduated color maps that show spatial variations in the gasoline price effects, 
their statistical significance, and the estimated mean effects on home values. We 
find that the elasticities are statistically significantly different from each other in 
most of the more than 50,000 location-location pairwise F-tests, and we graph 
the results in a way that is common in science but new to the economics 
literature.5 Finally, we directly apply our results to the potential outcomes of 
climate and energy policies. 
Our approach is different than that of Molloy and Shan (2013) in that our data is 
more spatially detailed and allows estimation of within-city differences in gasoline 
price effects with no a priori assumptions about which neighborhoods are likely 
to be most sensitive to gasoline prices (such as those with long commutes). This 
allows us to pick up relationships that could depend on factors other than work-
related travel.  
As noted by Malloy and Shan (2013), significant capitalization of gasoline prices 
may be more likely in areas where short run housing supply is inelastic, such as 
5 Padmos et al (2008), Table 1; Araya et al (2014), Extended Data Figure 10: Full-resolution view 
of global pairwise transcription factor co-association matrix. 
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Las Vegas. According to Saiz (2010), about 32 percent of the Las Vegas 
metropolitan area is undevelopable owing to physical or regulatory constraints, 
making it the 32nd most-constrained housing supply in the United States of the 95 
metropolitan statistical areas that have a population over 500,000. In addition, 
the U.S. federal government controls about 90 percent (about 4.66 million acres) 
of the land in Clark County.6 Several land sales by the U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management expanded the land available for housing development during the 
period of our data, but the large share of government ownership and the 
mountainous terrain surrounding the Las Vegas valley may, at least at times and 
in some places, impede the response of private markets to increased housing 
demand.7 According to Saiz (2010), Las Vegas is less constrained than a number 
of other large metropolitan areas such as New York City, Chicago, San Francisco, 
Los Angeles, San Diego, Miami, and Boston. Thus our results could suggest a role 
for gasoline prices in home values in other major property markets. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the hedonic model. Section 
3 describes the data for property sales and gasoline prices. It also addresses 
potential problems of misspecification. Section 4 reviews the results, and Section 
5 concludes. The appendix describes the treatment of the data in more detail 
and presents the results of an alternative (repeat sales) model. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Hedonic regression is a standard approach for estimating the relationship 
between the prices of houses and their characteristics.8 Owing to its intrinsically 
reduced form nature, no particular theory governs the structure or functional 
form of hedonic price models. A hedonic price schedule is simply the locus of 
tangencies between consumers’ bid functions and suppliers’ offer functions.9   
 
Our standard hedonic property price model postulates that the inflation-adjusted 
selling price of a house is a function of its physical characteristics and other 
6 Clark County Department of Comprehensive Planning (2013).  
7 The Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act of 1998 allows the Bureau of Land 
Management to sell public land within a specific boundary around Las Vegas.   
8 Rosen (1974), Campbell et al (2011) 
9 Chay and Greenstone (2005) 
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factors. The data include 930,702 home sales in Clark County, Nevada, from 
1976 through 2010. Clark County has a population of over two million residents 
and includes the two largest cities in Nevada, Las Vegas and Henderson. Its 
sprawling metropolitan area epitomizes large automobile-dependent western-U.S. 
cities.  
The typical log-log hedonic estimation equation for yist, the log price of house 
i in census tract s in the period of sale t, is: 
 
1) yist = c + αs + γt + β′ Xi + λsgmαs + μsumαs + ϵist. 
 
The variable c is a constant. The terms αs are indicators for the census tracts in 
which the properties lie. Alone, they control for time-invariant characteristics of 
neighborhoods. Most census tracts are small, so in general the tract indicators 
do a good job controlling for location; the median census tract is only .71 square 
miles in area.  Tract areas range from 0.16 to 2,181 square miles, and ten of our 
224 census tracts have land areas over 100 square miles. Despite the large size 
of some of the tracts, the observations are clustered close to the Las Vegas 
metropolitan area, and the terms αs are good indicators for location. The 
appendix maps the observations and reports the results of a repeat sales 
approach that controls even more carefully for location.  
 
The terms γt are year indicators, and they control for broad trends in the Clark 
County housing market.10 Period m (the month of sale) falls in year t. The vector 
Xi includes property characteristics that are standard in hedonic models, with 
coefficients β.  
 
The variable gm is the log price of gasoline in the month in which the home is 
sold, and the gmαs terms are its interactions with the census tract indicators. 
Thus the coefficient λs is the elasticity of the price of homes in census tract s with 
respect to the price of gasoline. Our focus is on the variation in and spatial 
patterns of these estimated elasticities. We expect λs will be relatively higher in 
locations that become more attractive when gasoline prices rise (all else equal) 
and λs will be relatively lower in locations that are less attractive when gasoline 
10 Including the interaction of census tract and year indicators is infeasible given the large number 
of years (35) and tracts (334) in our data. 
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prices rise. The absolute value of λs will be larger in areas most sensitive to 
gasoline prices, and it will be closer to zero in areas that are insensitive to 
gasoline prices. Equation 1 imposes no a priori restrictions the gasoline-
dependent location premia (or discounts) in each tract, such as a particular 
functional relationship with the distance from central business districts. This 
function-free approach is appropriate to Clark County, which has multiple major 
employment centers. 
 
The terms μsumαs help control for macroeconomic fluctuations that may affect 
home values differently in different neighborhoods. Broad macroeconomic 
fluctuations could drive both housing demand and oil demand, and that will shift 
the distribution of our estimated elasticities. By itself, that is not a problem for 
our study because we are focused on the relative value of homes in different 
neighborhoods, not area-wide average property values. However, in principle a 
strong economy could result in higher demand for housing in some 
neighborhoods than others. Likewise, a weak economy could depress the value 
of homes in some neighborhoods more than others, while also being correlated 
with lower gasoline prices. If this occurs, then the estimated coefficients on the 
location-gasoline price interaction terms could be biased. Thus, we include the 
terms um, measures of the unemployment rate in Nevada in the month of the 
property sale, interacted with the location indicators αs. The variable ϵist is an 
error term that reflects random variation in house prices.  
 
Some hedonic studies, particularly those that construct housing price indices, 
must carefully control for the physical characteristics of homes that are sold to 
reveal the underlying city-wide trends in home values as an asset class.11 In our 
application, as long as we appropriately control for the location of the home, the 
results of interest are not sensitive to whether the quality of homes or other 
unobserved characteristics of homes sold vary over time.   
 
It may be the case that when gasoline prices rise, more homes further from the 
city center are offered for sale while buyer interest in those distant homes 
wanes. Thus the volume of sales in those areas could on net go up or down, but 
11 Bajari et al (2012) review the issues that arise when omitted attributes are correlated with the 
observed variables. See Dorsey et al (2010) for more on estimating housing price indices. 
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either way, prices should unambiguously fall. The hedonic model could fit 
transactions in one neighborhood in a year better than another neighborhood in 
that same year. If so, errors would not be independent and identically distributed; 
the OLS estimates would be unbiased but the standard errors would be wrong. 
To address this, we estimate robust standard errors, and we cluster the errors 
by tract-year.12  
 
3. DATA 
 
This study combines data on property transactions with data on gasoline prices. 
In addition, we use data on the unemployment rates in Nevada from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
A. Property data 
 
We use data from about 931,000 arms’ length home sales in Clark County, 
Nevada, from January 1976 to December 2010, obtained from the Clark County 
Assessor’s Office. Clark County is an extreme example of the boom and bust 
U.S. housing market experience, and real home prices exhibit strong variation. 
The population of Clark County grew dramatically over the duration of the data, 
with an average annual growth rate of 5 percent from 1990 to 2009. The county 
population more than doubled from about 780,000 in 1990 to more than two 
million in 2009.13 To illustrate the broad market context of our study, Figure 1 
shows the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Sales Price Indices for Las Vegas and a 
broader Case-Shiller composite index for ten large U.S. cities. The boom was 
steeper and the freefall in 2008 was more dramatic in Las Vegas than in most 
other cities. 
 
  
12 Nichols and Schaffer (2007) 
13 Population data downloaded from Clark County Assessor on September 22, 2010, from 
http://www.accessclarkcounty.com/depts/comprehensive_planning/demographics/Pages/Demogra
phics.aspx. 
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 FIGURE 1. S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDICES, JANUARY 1990 TO DECEMBER 
2010 
 
 
Notes: Data for this figure are the S&P/Case-Shiller Seasonally Adjusted Home Price 
Index Levels, downloaded August 2, 2011, from 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-
indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-us----. 
 
Each unit of observation in the data is the sale of a residential property. The data 
include the actual selling price of the property, the sale date, and detailed 
characteristics of the home. As shown in TABLE 1, the property characteristics 
include lot size, square footage of living area, number of full baths, the age of the 
home at the time of sale, and indicators for amenities such as a pool.  
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TABLE 1.−SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Number of Observations = 930,702 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Property price ($) 245,019 146,315 40,005 2,309,211 
Living space (ft2) 1,904 759 280 7,988 
Lot size (acres) .16 .15 .01 5 
Home age (years) 9.32 12.48 0 109 
Pool indicator .21 .41 0 1 
Full bathrooms 2.19 .58 1 6 
Foreclosure indicator .063 .244 0 1 
Townhouse indicator 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Multiplex indicator 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Price per gallon of gasoline 
($) 
2.18 0.62 1.22 4.08 
Nevada state-level 
unemployment rate (%) 
6.44 3.16 3.8 14.9 
 
Notes: All dollar values appear in 2010 dollars, deflated using the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers. The data set combines information from the Clark 
County Assessor’s Office, the U.S. Census, and the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration.  
 
We also include an indicator for transactions the Clark County Assessor 
designates as linked to a foreclosure. Campbell et al (2011) note that illiquidity in 
the housing market can depress prices of forced sales. Using data from over 
1,800,000 home sales in Massachusetts from 1987 to March 2009, they find 
foreclosed homes sold at substantial discounts relative to other sales, about 27 
percent less on average. We therefore include an indicator in this study to 
estimate a similar average discount for the Clark County foreclosure 
transactions from 1976 through 2010. 
 
We removed outliers from the data as detailed in the Appendix. For example, 
given the specialized market for such properties, we exclude very large homes 
(greater than 8,000 sq. ft. of living area) and homes on very large lots (greater 
than five acres). We also drop sales of properties with prices under $40,000 or 
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over $5 million ($2010). These dropped observations collectively represent 4.6 
percent of the raw dataset. 
 
FIGURE 2 shows the distribution of the remaining 930,702 observations by year of 
sale from 1976 to 2010, with sales of new homes in blue and existing homes in 
red. The observations are heavily weighted towards the past two decades for 
two reasons. First, new home sales grew dramatically from the mid-1990s 
through 2006, as evidenced by the heights of the blue bars. Second, the Clark 
County database includes only the three most recent transactions for each 
property. Thus, although we observe some sales back to 1976, those 
observations are only of homes that were not subsequently sold more than two 
additional times by the end of 2010.  
 
FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY YEAR OF SALE, NEW AND EXISTING 
HOMES 
  
 
B. Gasoline prices 
 
Many hedonic studies infer the implicit price function for non-market factors 
such as air quality and natural open space. In that context, consistent estimation 
is difficult because unobserved factors (such as crime rates) could covary with 
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both the non-market factors and housing prices.14 Here, one might be concerned 
that, say, seasonality in gasoline prices and seasonality in housing markets could 
produce spurious correlation and compromise the interpretation of our 
estimated coefficients. Gasoline prices show the expected seasonal pattern of 
systematically higher levels in summer months, but property sales prices in Clark 
County, Nevada, do not show a strong seasonality -- less than one percent 
variation in sales price by calendar month of sale. The climate, the large share of 
new home sales in the data, and the attractiveness of Las Vegas for retirement 
and second homes could all contribute to this.15  
 
Potential misspecifications could also arise with local gasoline prices, which are a 
function of specific neighborhood characteristics, such as the scale and 
competitiveness of the local retail economy. We avoid this problem by using 
national average gasoline prices, which are unaffected by neighborhood 
characteristics in Clark County, Nevada. Another reason to use national gasoline 
prices in this study is that a key goal of this paper is to understand how national 
climate and energy policies can affect local housing markets. In that context it 
makes sense to exclude within-city gasoline price deviations, which are unlikely 
to be affected by national or state-level energy policy. FIGURE 3 shows the U.S. 
national average of gasoline prices from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) in nominal and 2010 dollars. The figure shows significant 
variation in real gasoline prices over the period of this study, from a low of $1.22 
in February 1999 to a high of $4.08 per gallon in June 2008.  
 
  
14 For example, see Gayer et al (2002). Chay and Greenstone (2005), Halvorsen and Pollakowski 
(1981), and Cropper et al (1988) discuss the challenges of misspecification of hedonic price 
models. 
15 We estimated Equation (1) both with and without calendar month indicators and find that they 
add no appreciable explanatory value.  
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FIGURE 3. MONTHLY U.S. AVERAGE MOTOR GASOLINE RETAIL PRICE, JANUARY 1976 
TO DECEMBER 2010 
 
Notes: Data for gasoline prices are from EIA’s Short-Term Energy Outlook - Real 
Energy Prices data series, February 2011 update. See 
http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/steo/realprices/index.cfm. Prices are for regular grade gasoline. 
 
Households should consider the expected price of gas when deciding how far to 
live from work. Empirically, however, the current level of gas prices appears to 
be a good proxy for the expected future price.16 Anderson et al (2011) find that 
the average consumer expects the future real price of gasoline to equal the 
current price, and consumers exhibit a reasonable forecast in most instances.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
A. Hedonic Model  
 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of a model that includes log gas prices and 
Nevada unemployment rates, but not their interactions with location indicators.  
16 Molloy and Shan (2010), Alquist and Kilian (2010), Bopp and Lady (1991), and Chinn and 
Coibion (2010) 
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TABLE 2.− MODEL WITHOUT INTERACTIONS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LN(PROPERTY SALE PRICE) 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Estimate  
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Constant 8.288 *** 0.0502 165.03 0.000 8.1893 8.3862 
ln(gasoline price) 0.051 *** 0.0075 6.71 0.000 0.0358 0.0653 
Nevada 
unemployment 
rate (in percent) 
-0.049 *** 0.0014 -33.68 0.000 -0.0515 -0.0458 
ln (Square 
footage of home) 
0.579 *** 0.0051 112.65 0.000 0.5693 0.5894 
ln(Lot size in 
acres) 
0.141 *** 0.0040 35.50 0.000 0.1327 0.1483 
Age -0.007 *** 0.0003 -23.09 0.000 -0.0081 -0.0068 
Age*Age 0.000  0.0000 -0.39 0.697 0.0000 0.0000 
Pool indicator 0.066 *** 0.0012 54.02 0.000 0.0639 0.0687 
Number of full 
baths 
0.027 *** 0.0018 15.31 0.000 0.0238 0.0308 
Multiplex 
indicator 
-0.032 *** 0.0088 -3.60 0.000 -0.0488 -0.0144 
Townhouse 
indicator 
0.000  0.0049 0.05 0.957 -0.0094 0.0100 
Foreclosure 
indicator 
-0.147 *** 0.0047 -31.51 0.000 -0.1560 -0.1377 
Year indicators (shown in Figure 4) Yes 
Census tract indicators (count = 335) Yes 
Census tract indicators interacted with ln(gasoline price) No 
Census tract indicators interacted with Nevada unemployment 
rate in sale month No 
Number of observations = 930702 
R-squared = 0.810 
Root MSE = .227 
 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Dollar values are in real $2010. Standard errors are clustered by tract-year, 
with a total of 9759 distinct groups. 
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The coefficient in Table 2 on the log of gasoline prices suggests that a one 
percent increase in the real gasoline price is associated with a .05 percent 
increase in home values. This likely reflects a small broad positive relationship 
between gasoline prices and home prices via macroeconomic conditions, even 
when controlling for state unemployment rates. In other words, when economic 
growth is strong, so are both home values and demand for transportation fuel. A 
spatially systematic variation in this correlation could lead to spurious results 
when we interact gasoline prices with location indicators. For example, home 
values in the urban core could be relatively more closely tied to a cyclical tourist 
economy than homes on the outskirts of town, and thus be more positively 
related to gasoline prices. Ideally, we would employ an instrument for gasoline 
prices that is uncorrelated with macroeconomic conditions, but such an 
instrument is elusive. Rather we simply note that the magnitude and distribution 
of the estimated elasticities may be skewed if home values in some 
neighborhoods are more procyclical than in others, even when controlling for 
state-wide macroeconomic conditions.  
 
The other estimated coefficients on the housing characteristics shown in Table 2 
are broadly consistent with other hedonic studies such as Walls et al (2013). For 
example, the results suggest that a one percent increase in the square footage of 
the home, all other factors equal, translates into about a 0.6 percent increase in 
the sales price of the property. The estimated coefficient on the foreclosure 
indicator suggests that distressed property sales produce a 13.5 percent lower 
selling price than other sales of comparable properties. Our result is smaller but 
of the same order of magnitude as the results of Campbell et al (2011), who 
estimated foreclosure discounts on average of 27 percent on 1.8 million house 
transactions in Massachusetts from 1987 through March 2009. Figure 4 shows 
the year indicators in the model in Table 2. From 1990 on, they track the Case-
Shiller indices in Figure 1, with the exception that the year indicators in our 
model show a dip in the mid-1990s.  
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FIGURE 4. YEAR-SPECIFIC EFFECTS IN MODEL IN TABLE 2, 1976 TO 2010 
 
 
Notes: This graph reports the year specific effects in the model reported in Table 2. 
The values on the vertical axis indicate the overall change in real prices of properties 
sold relative to 1976. 
 
As discussed above, the variance of the error term may not be constant for a 
number of reasons, including because the fit of the model could be systematically 
worse for certain property sub-markets than others. For example, Goodman and 
Thibodeau (1997) demonstrate strong heteroscedasticity in hedonic housing 
price models that is related the age of the dwelling. We conducted a Breusch–
Pagan test, which confirmed heteroscedasticity. We estimate robust standard 
errors and cluster the errors by tract-year.  
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of our core model, which includes 
interactions between the price of gasoline and state unemployment rates with 
location indicators. The coefficients on the hedonic variables show little 
difference from the model in Table 2.  
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TABLE 3.−MAIN RESULTS: MODEL WITH LOCATION INTERACTIONS  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LN(PROPERTY SALE PRICE)  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Estimate  
Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Constant 8.512 *** 0.064 131.9 0.000 8.3856 8.6386 
ln (Square footage 
of home) 
0.577 *** 0.005 113.86 0.000 0.5670 0.5869 
ln(Lot size in 
acres) 
0.144 *** 0.004 36.62 0.000 0.1366 0.1520 
Age -0.009 *** 0.000 -30.48 0.000 -0.0094 -0.0083 
Age*Age 0.000 *** 0.000 6.18 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pool indicator 0.068 *** 0.001 55.09 0.000 0.0652 0.0700 
Number of full 
baths 
0.027 *** 0.002 15.46 0.000 0.0235 0.0303 
Multiplex indicator -0.021 *** 0.008 -2.58 0.0100 -0.0375 -0.0051 
Townhouse 
indicator 
0.002 * 0.005 0.44 0.659 -0.0074 0.0117 
Foreclosure 
indicator 
-0.134 *** 0.004 -33.23 0.000 -0.1420 -0.1262 
Year indicators Yes 
Census tract indicators (count = 335) Yes 
Census tract indicators interacted with ln(gasoline price) Yes 
Census tract indicators interacted with Nevada unemployment 
rate in sale month Yes 
  Number of observations = 930,702 
R-squared = 0.819 
Root MSE = 0.222 
 
Notes: Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Dollar values are in real $2010. Standard errors are clustered by 
tract-year, with 9758 distinct groups. 
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Tables 4 and 5 report summary statistics on the estimated elasticities, and Figure 
5 is a histogram of the values. The elasticities of home prices with respect to 
gasoline prices range across the set of 335 census tracts from -.77 to 1.09, with 
an (un-weighted) mean value of .06.  
 
TABLE 4.−DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES 
 
Number of Observations = 335 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Interaction of Census 
Tract indictors and 
Property price 
0.0607 0.1388 -0.7731 1.0854 
Interaction of Census 
Tract indictors and 
Nevada state-level 
unemployment rate (%) 
-0.0511 0.0193 -0.0905 0.0246 
 
 
TABLE 5. − CENTILES OF 335 ESTIMATED GASOLINE PRICE ELASTICITIES 
 
Percentile 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
Centile 
Value for 
Elasticity -0.078 -0.014 0.023 0.051 0.066 0.086 0.107 0.134 0.183 
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FIGURE 5. HISTOGRAM OF ESTIMATED GAS PRICE ELASTICITIES IN 335 CENSUS TRACTS: 
HEDONIC MODEL 
 
 
A few of the estimated coefficients in Figure 5 have implausibly large absolute 
values. For example, three tracts have estimated elasticities in excess of .5, 
meaning that a 10 percent increase in the price of gasoline is associated with an 
increase the home value of 5 percent.17 Another tract recorded an implausibly 
low elasticity of -0.773.18 In most of these cases, a large share of a relatively low 
number of tract-level observations occurred in a one or two-year timeframe.19 
Such temporally concentrated observations can produce anomalous coefficients 
as a result of coincidental moves in gas prices and home values.  
 
Abstracting from implausible tail estimates, we find that the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of the estimated elasticities are -0.08 and 0.18, respectively. This 
means that a ten percent increase in the price of gasoline is associated with a 
17 These elasticities are 0.506 for tract 2962, 0.625 for tract 5609, and 1.085 for tract 2602. 
18 Tract 2506 
19 To illustrate, 27.55 percent of tract 2602’s 98 home sales occurred in 2007. 25.8 percent of 
the population of only 310 home sales that took place in Tract 5609 occurred in 2003-2004. 
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range of home price changes between about negative one percent to positive 
two percent. 
 
The estimated elasticities for each of the tracts are illustrated in the graduated 
color maps in Figure 6 and Figure 7.  
 
FIGURE 6. ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF PROPERTY PRICES WITH RESPECT TO 
GASOLINE PRICES:  CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 
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FIGURE 7. HEDONIC MODEL’S ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF PROPERTY PRICES WITH 
RESPECT TO GASOLINE PRICES:  CENTRAL CLARK COUNTY (LAS VEGAS, NORTH LAS 
VEGAS, AND HENDERSON)  
 
 
The color of each tract is coded to its estimated elasticity of property prices 
with respect to gasoline prices, with each color comprising ten percent of the 
tracts. Major highways appear in red. Figure 7 reports the same information as 
Figure 6, zooming in on central Clark County. The red star in Figure 7 is an 
intersection of major highways labeled “central Las Vegas.” The Las Vegas strip 
lies on a diagonal directly below that point towards the southwest. White areas 
are tracts in which there are no property transactions in our data, and they 
include McCarran International Airport, the University of Nevada Las Vegas, and 
areas dense in hotels and casinos. 
 
The figures and maps show a wide range of estimated elasticities. Some areas of 
higher elasticities (darker areas) appear in the urban core of Las Vegas and some 
Central  
Las Vegas 
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higher elasticities ring the city along major highways.  There are also darker 
patches near other cities within Clark County, such as Henderson and North Las 
Vegas. Figure 8 maps the location of these cities.  
 
FIGURE 8. CENTRAL CLARK COUNTY: LAS VEGAS, NORTH LAS VEGAS, AND 
HENDERSON20 
 
 
Figure 7 shows a notably dark strip of relatively high and positive elasticities 
running from the southwest to the northeast diagonally through the Las Vegas 
strip area. Mean elasticities appear to fall in distance from the strip, and 
elasticities in rural areas are generally small or negative, as shown by the lightest 
20 Las Vegas, Google Maps, Downloaded February 7, 2014. 
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blue areas. The color pattern is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that the 
relative values of properties in areas closer to the city center are more positively 
correlated to gasoline prices, but the map also indicates some differences 
between estimated elasticities even across adjacent tracts. 
 
A few of the very rural tracts report relatively high elasticities, as shown by their 
dark blue color. Some of these tracts have very few observations, and a number 
of these elasticities, although relatively large, are not statistically different from 
zero at a 90 percent confidence interval. The pattern of declining elasticity from 
the urban core is even more pronounced in the repeat sales results, discussed in 
the Appendix, than it is in Figure 7. This is consistent with the more recent 
profile of sales in the repeat sales dataset.  
 
FIGURE 9 reports the P-value of the estimated elasticities. The white tracts are 
those with an estimated elasticity that is not statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 90 percent confidence level or lower, meaning that one cannot 
reject the hypothesis that gasoline has no effect on home values. The darkest 
blue and red tracts are those in which we reject the null that the elasticity is 
zero with a 99 percent or higher degree of confidence with positive and negative 
elasticities, respectively. The two intermediate colors (orange and yellow for 
negative elasticities; light blue and green for positive elasticities) represent 
confidence levels of 95 to 99 percent and 90 to 95 percent, respectively.  
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FIGURE 9. P-VALUES OF ESTIMATED GASOLINE PRICE ELASTICITIES 
PANEL A 
 
PANEL B 
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The maps suggest that the results with the greatest (positive) statistical 
significance, the dark blue areas, are those closest to the city center and to the 
west and south of Las Vegas around the Highway 215 corridor. The most 
statistically significant and negative elasticities are one large tract to the south of 
the metropolitan area and a cluster to the west, which is surrounded by tracts 
with negative and highly statistically significant elasticities.  
 
Owing to small number of transactions, some of the very rural and mid-city 
tracts do not show a statistically significant relationship between gasoline prices 
and home values despite having relatively large estimated elasticities in absolute 
value.  
 
The spatial pattern of the elasticities is partly consistent with the theory that the 
values of closer-in homes tend to be more positively related to gasoline prices 
than further-out homes within the same housing market, but the effect is far 
from a simple monotonic relationship with distance from the urban core. The 
confidence around the results is particularly strong for central and suburban 
areas, but elasticities in adjacent areas do not necessarily have the same sign or 
significance.  
 
The results described so far indicate that gasoline prices do indeed affect home 
values in a significant share of neighborhoods across the county. We now turn to 
question of the extent to which the estimated elasticities in different tracts are 
significantly different from each other. To get at that, we conducted a full set of 
55,945 unique pairwise F tests, each one testing a hypothesis that a particular 
estimated elasticity is equal to another.21 The color-coded results appear in a 
(necessarily) symmetric 335 by 335 matrix in Figure 10. As a simple organizing 
format for the matrix (but not pertinent to the econometric approach), we 
calculated the mean longitude and latitude coordinates for the observations 
within each tract (i.e., the “center” of the tract). Then we sorted the tracts by 
the distance of their center to central Las Vegas. Thus, the upper left hand 
corner of the matrix reports the P-values of the center-city tracts compared to 
each other and the lower right shows the results of the most rural tracts 
21 The number of unique pairs of census tracts is given by (335 x 334)/2 = 55,945. 
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compared to each other. The P-values of the pairwise F-tests fall into blue 
confidence/color categories similar to the map in Figure 9, with the darkest 
elements representing a 99 percent confidence level that the estimated 
elasticities are statistically significantly different from each other and the white 
elements representing a confidence level below 90 percent.  
 
FIGURE 10. PAIRWISE F-TEST P-VALUES OF ESTIMATED GASOLINE PRICE ELASTICITIES 
Legend 
Range of P Value of F test Fill Color 
P > .1  
.1 ≤ P < .05  
.05 ≤ P < .01  
P < .01  
 
 
 
Notes: Rows and columns are 335 census tracts sorted by distance to central Las 
Vegas. Thus the upper left tests tracts close to central Las Vegas against each other, and 
the lower right tests exurban tracts against each other.  
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The upper right and lower left areas of the Figure 10 matrix show the urban 
tracts compared to the rural tracts. Those areas appear generally darker, 
informally supporting the intuition that property values in the urban core and 
rural/exurban areas tend to have significantly different relationships with gasoline 
prices. But the figure also shows that significant differences arise across 
neighborhoods equidistant from the urban core. 
 
B. Elasticities in Sub-Periods  
 
The relationship between home prices and gasoline prices may have changed 
through the 35 year period of our data. Certainly, the spatial pattern of 
employment centers and housing developments has shifted significantly in Las 
Vegas since the 1970s. From 1974 to 2010, the Clark County population grew by 
over 580 percent, and major developments arose in the Las Vegas suburbs of 
Summerlin, Green Valley, and Henderson.22 Figure 11shows the extraordinary 
growth of the Las Vegas area in satellite images from 1973 to 2006.23 Moreover, 
as Hughes et al (2008) note, factors such as Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) standards, the growth of multiple income households and per capita 
disposable income, and the evolution in public transit have changed the 
responsiveness of U.S. consumers to changes in gasoline prices. Households may 
also have shifted their beliefs about the extent to which changes in gasoline 
prices are likely to persist. 
  
22 http://www.lasvegasnevada.gov/files/PopulationEstimate.pdf 
23 http://www.nasa.gov/images/content/202842main_lasvegas_lg.jpg 
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FIGURE 11. SATELLITE MAPS OF LAS VEGAS IN 1973, 1991, 2000, AND 2006 
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May.1973 
Population 358,400 
May,2(0) 
Population1,563.282 
June. 1991 
Population 937.261 
February, 2006 
Population 2,013267 
To see whether the pattern of estimated elasticities has changed substantially 
over time, we conducted six hedonic regressions of overlapping 10-year sub-
periods of the data, inclusive of the years: 1976-85, 1981-90, 1986-95, 1991-2000, 
1996-2005, and 2001-2010. The first six panels of Figure 12 show histograms of 
the estimated price elasticities of home values with respect to gasoline prices in 
those sub-periods of the data, following the estimation model reported in Table 
3.  
 
FIGURE 12. HISTOGRAMS OF PROPERTY PRICE-GAS PRICE ELASTICITIES, SUB-
PERIODS  (VALUES FROM -0.5 TO 0.5 SHOWN) 
PANEL 1: (1976-85); 2: (1981-90); 3: (1986-95); 4: (1991-2000); 5: (1996-2005); 6: (2001-
2010) 
PANEL 7: HOUSING BOOM, FROM JANUARY 2002 TO APRIL 2006 (INCLUSIVE) 
PANEL 8: HOUSING BUST, FROM APRIL 2006 THROUGH DECEMBER 2010 (INCLUSIVE) 
PANEL 9: FULL SAMPLE, FROM JANUARY 1976 THROUGH DECEMBER 2010 
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In the early periods, panels one through three, the elasticities are widely 
dispersed, just shy of a uniform distribution. By the 1990s (panel four), the 
elasticities begin to show a more strongly normal distribution centered between 
0 and 0.1. By the last decade (panel six) of 2001 to 2010, the elasticities fall in a 
much narrower distribution, with a density strongly concentrated in the 0 to 0.1 
range. This suggests that the broad sensitivity (positive and negative) of home 
prices to contemporaneous gasoline prices has fallen significantly over the period 
of our data, and the distribution of elasticities has narrowed considerably.  
 
The intensity of the relationship between housing values and gasoline prices may 
have fallen in part as the overall fuel economy of the vehicle fleet has risen. For 
example, the average fuel economy of new cars sold in 2010 was over 70 
percent higher than new cars sold in 1975.24 All else equal, we would expect this 
to dampen the sensitivity of home prices to gasoline prices.  
 
We also ran the regressions with data confined to the months of the Las Vegas 
housing boom, as defined by the major run-up in the Case-Shiller housing price 
index from January 2002 to its high in April 2006 (inclusive), and the housing 
bust from April 2006 to the end of our data in December 2010 (inclusive). Panel 
seven in Figure 12 shows the elasticities of sales in the months of the housing 
boom. Panel eight includes sales in the months of the housing bust that followed. 
The distribution of elasticities in the boom is similar to the almost uniform 
distribution of earlier periods while elasticities in the bust are more narrowly 
distributed with a mode near zero. This suggests that the distribution of 
relationships (not just the average relationship) of gasoline prices to home values 
could depend on the direction of the economy.  
 
For comparison, panel nine in Figure 12 shows the elasticities of sales for the 
entire period, the same data that appear in Figure 5. The spatial characteristics 
(not shown) of the elasticities in later years (panels six through eight) indicate a 
pattern of declining elasticities from the urban core slightly more pronounced 
than elasticities in the full period shown in Figure 7. So although the distribution 
of elasticities in later years is tighter, the overall spatial pattern of elasticities we 
24 EPA (2013). Hughes et al (2008) find that the short-run price elasticity of U.S. gasoline demand 
is significantly more inelastic in recent years than in the late 1970s. 
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see for the full sample holds throughout the period and may even intensify in 
more recent years. 
 
C. Comparative Statics 
 
In this section, to assess the potential spread of home values produced by a 
change in gasoline prices, we estimate the dollar value effect of an illustrative 
increase of ten percent in gasoline prices on the relative value of homes in 
different neighborhoods.25  
 
For comparison, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), H.R. 
2454 (the Waxman-Markey climate bill) would have raised gasoline prices by 27 
cents per gallon, or 7.6%, in 2020 relative the baseline value of $3.55 (in $2007). 
Ten percent of the mean gasoline price in our data is about $0.22, a common 
swing in gasoline prices, and it equates to the implications of a carbon tax of 
about $22 per ton of CO2.
26 Such a tax is in the range of recent carbon tax 
proposals and the social cost of carbon as estimated by the Obama 
Administration.27  
 
To narrow the estimation results to plausible values, we windsorize the sample 
of elasticities by dropping the highest and lowest two percent. To obtain the 
change in home values relative to the mean, we subtract the mean elasticity 
(about 0.06) from all of the estimated elasticities to obtain deviations in 
elasticities from the mean. Then we multiply all of the deviations in elasticities by 
ten to obtain the predicted percent change in home values for each tract given 
an increase in gasoline prices of ten percent, relative to the mean. We evaluate 
this change at the average property price in each tract to derive the expected 
dollar level change in home prices, relative to the mean.  
 
Figure 13 shows the graduated color map of the dollar value changes, relative to 
the mean, for a ten percent ($0.22) increase in gasoline prices in central Clark 
County. Figure 14 shows the results for the full county. The estimated home 
price effects range from about -$7,850 to $5,590.  
25 See EIA (2009), page 36, Figure 26. 
26 Ramseur et al (2012), Table 3. 
27 CBO (2013); U.S. Government Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (2013)  
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FIGURE 13. ESTIMATED CHANGE IN PROPERTY PRICES WITH A 10% INCREASE IN 
GASOLINE PRICES, RELATIVE TO MEAN, OUTLIERS DELETED 
CENTRAL CLARK COUNTY (LAS VEGAS, NORTH LAS VEGAS, AND HENDERSON) 
 
 
 
  
Central  
Las Vegas 
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FIGURE 14. ESTIMATED CHANGE IN PROPERTY PRICES WITH A 10% INCREASE IN 
GASOLINE PRICES, RELATIVE TO MEAN, CLARK COUNTY  
 
The largest negative values are in the northern and southwest suburbs of the city, 
and the largest positive values are in the urban core and the southern periphery. 
These results reflect a combination of the magnitude of the elasticities and the 
mean home values in these areas. Areas near major roads and highways, possibly 
because they offer easy access to efficient travel paths, tend towards more 
positive (blue) effects. That said, Figure 13 shows some adjacent neighborhoods 
that have estimated price effects that are statistically significantly different from 
zero and of opposite sign. This suggests there could be important unobservables, 
perhaps such as demographics or access to public transit, that bear on the 
results. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS 
 
We find that gasoline prices can affect property values in different 
neighborhoods differently. Using data from 930,702 home sales in Clark County, 
Nevada, from 1976 through 2010, we estimate the elasticities of property prices 
with respect to gasoline prices, allowing the effect to vary by census tract. The 
estimated elasticities range from about -.07 to about 0.18 across the census 
tracts in the data, meaning that a ten percent increase in gasoline prices can shift 
relative home values over a range about 2.5 percentage points.  
 
These results suggest gasoline prices may be affecting credit risks, property 
markets, and household wealth in ways the economic literature has so far not 
fully recognized. While some studies have found that in general gasoline prices 
are not significant determinants of home values and foreclosure, our results 
suggest that there may be significant location-specific risks within metropolitan 
areas. 28 We see some evidence of this in outlying suburbs but the effect is also 
important in other areas. 
 
Our investigation of the evolution of the relationship of gasoline prices to home 
values suggests that the broad sensitivity (positive and negative) of home prices 
to gasoline prices has fallen significantly since 1976. This could derive in part 
from the 70 percent increase from 1975 to 2010 in the average fuel economy of 
new cars sold in the United States.  
 
Our results also bear on the potential distributional effects of a carbon tax or 
other policy to price greenhouse gas emissions. A ten percent increase in the 
gasoline price, a change on the order of the short run effects of recent proposed 
climate legislation, is associated with changes in location-specific average home 
values that span a range of over $13,000; households with homes near the 
center of the city and near major corridors would be better off by up to about 
$5,600, and some households living in the city outskirts would lower mean home 
values by $7,800, relative to the mean. The net effect on much of the mid-city is 
28 Molloy and Shan (2010), Duling (2008) 
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small, within $500 plus or minus. However, despite these broad spatial patterns 
we find instances of significant differences in the effect of gasoline prices even 
across adjacent neighborhoods. This suggests that location alone is not a perfect 
predictor of how gasoline prices can affect home values and that there is more 
to this story left for future investigation. 
 
Our results could be pertinent to other important property markets. Cities with 
housing supply constraints at least as binding as Las Vegas include, according to 
Saiz (2010), New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Miami, and San Francisco. 
 
Several extensions to our work are clear. First, given this evidence that gasoline 
prices do matter, it would be useful to explore potential explanations of the 
estimated elasticities other than location. For example, tracts with higher mean 
household income may have property values that are less sensitive to gasoline 
prices, positive or negative. This could have implications for the distribution by 
income of the housing wealth effects of a carbon tax. Certainly commuting costs 
as a share of home value are likely to vary by the overall price point of a 
neighborhood. Other demographics, such as the share of non-working age adults, 
might also matter. And tracts closer to employment centers, highways, and 
public transport could systematically have relatively more positive relationship to 
gasoline prices. Areas with older homes or greater population density may have 
less elastic housing supply, and thus be more prone to gasoline price 
capitalization (positive or negative). Relating the gasoline price effects to 
neighborhood income levels would also estimate the potential impacts of carbon 
pricing on households’ housing wealth by socioeconomic status. 
 
Another question left open by this study is whether asymmetries in the 
constraints on housing supply produce asymmetries in the effect of gasoline 
prices. For instance, housing supply may be more elastic upward than downward, 
particularly in city outskirts. Thus, outlying areas may experience larger negative 
downward capitalization when gasoline prices rise than they do positive upward 
capitalization when gasoline prices fall. Another finding worth investigating 
further is the different patterns of elasticities in the months of a housing boom 
and the months of the housing bust depicted in Figure 12. 
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Finally, a natural extension of our results would be to explore the spatial 
patterns of the housing bubble collapse in Las Vegas starting in 2006, the worst 
such implosion in the United States.29 Cortright (2008) and Kaufman et al (2010) 
suggest a role of energy prices in declining property market conditions in the 
post-2005 era. Estimations could show whether Clark County homes in areas 
with significant negative relationships between home values and gasoline prices 
were especially prone to foreclosure.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Data discussion 
 
This section discusses the construction of the dataset used in the regressions. 
This study combines data from three separate data sources. For transaction 
information, the study uses data from home sales in Clark County, Nevada, from 
January 1976 to December 2010, obtained from the Clark County Assessor’s 
Office (CCAO).30 We use the x and y coordinates to map every property to the 
most recent available census tract boundaries. Thus we ensure that the tract 
identifier for each property is constant for all the sales of the property in our 
data, even if the official census tract of the property has changed over time. 
The geographic distribution by census tract of the observations in the dataset 
appears in Figure A. Panel 1 shows that the census tracts with the greatest 
numbers of property sales in our data are concentrated in central Clark County 
near the cities of Las Vegas, Henderson, and North Las Vegas. Each dot in the 
inset of Panel 1 represents the location of a transaction, indicating that 
transactions within large tracts are generally spatially concentrated in a small 
area of the tract. Panel 2 shows that within central Clark County, the census 
tracts with the largest numbers of transactions in our data fall outside the city 
center of Las Vegas, indicated by the diagonal white and light pink areas in the 
center left of Panel 2.  
  
30 Further documentation on the data set is available at the Clark County Assessor’s website. 
Information about the residential records appears at: 
http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/assessor/Pages/ResidentialRecordLayoutInformation.aspx. 
Information about the specific sales codes appears at: 
http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/assessor/Documents/Sales%20Codes.pdf.  
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FIGURE 15. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS:  
PANEL 1: ALL OF CLARK COUNTY, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF TRANSACTIONS 
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PANEL 2. -- CENTRAL CLARK COUNTY
 
We exclude observations that are unlikely to represent ordinary arms’ length 
transactions or vacant land. To do this, we use the CCAO codes that indicate 
the type of sale for improved properties. Sale types included in the dataset are 
listed in Table A.1. 
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TABLE A.1. CCAO SALES CODES INCLUDED IN RAW DATA  
(975,584 OBSERVATIONS) 
 
Sale Code Description 
R Regular sale 
Y Resale in the market range 
Z First time sale in the market range 
T Contract sale, includes land and new construction 
N First time sale or resale above or below market, includes 
sacrifice, second mortgage, introduction sales 
X Foreclosure resale, tax sale, estate sale in the market range 
W Foreclosure resale, tax sale, estate sale above or below 
market 
M Sales price is the total purchase price for many or numerous 
parcels being transferred on the same deed or one purchase 
price was paid for several parcels conveyed on several deeds. 
    
We constructed a separate foreclosure indicator using the CCAO Foreclosure 
code. We also create indicator variables for the years in which the transaction 
occurs and convert all price variables to real 2010 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index (All Urban Consumers: U.S. city average deflator) from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.31  
 
We dropped observations with values that suggest the property is likely to be 
extremely unusual, a non-arms’-length transaction, or coded in error. Thus we 
drop properties with a real price of less than $40,000 or less than one full bath.  
 
Given the specialized market for such properties, we exclude homes on lots 
larger than five acres and greater than 8,000 square feet of living space. We also 
drop sales of homes with prices over $5 million ($2010) or with more than six 
full baths. We also drop properties with an unusually high price per square foot 
of over $300 per square foot. The deleted observations collectively represent 
4.6 percent of the raw data set. 
 
31 http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid10av.pdf. BLS Table 1A. 
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Using the year and month of the transaction, we merge the property data with 
data for the national average gasoline price and the Nevada state unemployment 
rate. We created logged values for continuous variables, including the sales price 
of the property, gasoline prices, living area, and lot size. To compute the age of 
the home in years, we subtract the year of the transaction from the variable in 
the data that indicates the year the home was built. In some cases the property 
is sold before the home is built, for example through an advance property sale. 
In that case we set the age to zero. Home sales with an age of zero appear as 
“New” in the blue bars of FIGURE 2. 
 
B. Repeat sales alternative model 
 
A repeat sales approach eliminates the problem of omitted variables with 
respect to time-invariant characteristics of the property. Assuming the changes 
in housing prices are in percentage terms, we write this log-log model:  
 
1) Δyist = αs + γt + λsΔgmαs + μsΔum αs + ϵist. 
The dependent variable is the difference in the log price of a home from one sale 
to the next, Δyist. This is the appreciation of the price of property i in census tract 
s over the period between sales. The variable ϵist is an error term that reflects 
random variation in house prices, and the terms αs are indicators for the census 
tracts in which the properties lie. The year indicators γt in the repeat sales 
model are a little different than in the hedonic model because we want to 
control for year effects both in the year of purchase and sale. Thus γt is -1 if the 
home was purchased in year t and +1 if it was sold in year t. This approach 
ensures that the year-specific effects on home price appreciation are symmetric 
but of opposite sign, depending on whether the transaction was a purchase or a 
sale.  
 
The terms Δgmαs are the change in real log gasoline prices from purchase to sale, 
interacted with census tract indicators. Likewise, the terms μsΔum αs interact the 
change in state unemployment levels and census tract indicators. Our data 
report almost no appreciable changes in property characteristics, so Equation 2 
does not include a vector of changes in characteristics corresponding to the β′ Xi 
in Equation 1. The estimated elasticities of property prices with respect to 
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gasoline prices in the repeat sales model (Equation 2) will not match perfectly 
the estimated elasticities in the hedonic model (Equation 1). Although 
arithmetically the two coefficients are the same, only about 442,900 of the 
approximately 931,000 homes sales in the full dataset are repeat sales, i.e. sales 
of a property for which we also have data on a prior sale. For example, the 
repeat sales data exclude all sales of new homes (except as a cost basis for 
subsequent sales), represented by the blue bars of FIGURE 2, along with the first 
sale of each non-new property after December 1975.  Table A.2 reports the 
repeat sales data summary statistics and estimation model. 
 
TABLE A.2.− REPEAT SALES MODEL 
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND ESTIMATION MODEL  
 Number of Observations = 442,900 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
∆ln(Property price) -.047 .484 -2.90 3.46 
∆ln(Price per gallon of 
gasoline) .098 .288 -1.04 1.21 
∆Nevada state-level 
unemployment rate 
(percentage points) 
1.49 3.70 -8.4 11.1 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CHANGE IN LN(PROPERTY SALE PRICE) SINCE LAST SALE 
Year indicators for 1977 through 2010 (= -1 if the home was purchased 
in year t and +1 if it was sold in year t) 
Yes 
Census tract indicators for 335 tracts 
Yes 
Census tract indicators interacted with change ln(gasoline price) from 
purchase to sale 
Yes 
Census tract indicators interacted with change in Nevada 
unemployment rate from purchase month to sale month 
Yes 
Number of observations = 442,900 
 R-squared = 0. 644 
 Root MSE = 0.290 
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FIGURE 16 below shows histogram of the estimated elasticities for the repeat sales 
model. The repeat sales results show a pattern broadly similar to that in Figure 5 
for the hedonic model, but with a somewhat greater density in the positive range 
between 0 and 0.25. This is consistent with the results in Figure 12, panels 5 and 
6, which show a generally more positive set of elasticities in the later decades of 
the data.  
 
FIGURE 16. ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF PROPERTY PRICES WITH RESPECT TO GASOLINE 
PRICES: REPEAT SALES AND HEDONIC MODELS
 
 
Figure 17 below is a graduated color map of the results from the repeat sales 
model. The map shows an overall pattern of larger positive elasticities in the 
urban core and elasticities that are closer to zero or slightly negative in the 
outskirts. The pattern of declining elasticity from the urban core is more 
pronounced in the repeat sales map than it is in Figure 7, which maps the results 
from the hedonic model estimated with the full dataset. This could be due to 
either the improved control for location inherent in a repeat sales approach, but 
it is also consistent with the pattern in more recent property sales as discussed 
per Figure 12. 
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FIGURE 17. REPEAT SALE MODEL  
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF PROPERTY PRICES  
WITH RESPECT TO GASOLINE PRICES: 
CENTRAL CLARK COUNTY (LAS VEGAS, NORTH LAS VEGAS, AND HENDERSON) 
 
Central  
Las Vegas 
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